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Introduction
 The traditional national competitiveness in mature, techno-
logically moderate industries such as machine tools, metalwork-
ing, and automobile production had provided an engine for growth,
high employment, and economic stability in the developed world
for most of the post-war economic period. However, this tested
formula of traditional competitive edge has been lost in the high
cost economies in the recent times (David Audretsch, 2000). The
loss of competitive edge in the large manufacturing sector and
subsequent great industrial rush to the cheaper locations in the
developing world prompted intense debate on ‘de-industrializa-
tion’ and ‘hollowing out’ of substantial industrial capacities. The
reason for this economic phenomena cited ‘globalization of pro-
duction process’ as the most crucial factor in the declining na-
tional competitiveness. Declining competitiveness was aggravated
by the collapse of communism, which provided industries an
opportunity to tap large labor pool in the transition economies.
This change rendered national competitiveness in the traditional
moderate technology industries incompatible with high wage
levels of the developed world.
Nevertheless, emerging borderless global knowledge economy
provided new competitive edge, largely to the developed econo-
mies, which can be compatible with the high wage level of rich
nations. The fundamental reorganization in the national competi-
tiveness moved in the two visible phases: “competitiveness lost”
in the traditional industrial sectors and “competitiveness regained”
in the new knowledge-based sectors. In other words, mostly la-
bor-intensive manufacturing sector lost competitiveness whereas
knowledge-based, service sector gained competitiveness in the
developed world. In this context of shifting parameters of na-
tional competitiveness, the clear understanding of far-reaching
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impact of knowledge as the most
important factor in the wealth
creation mechanism must be given
due recognition. Clear pronounce-
ments such as ‘Knowledge cen-
tury’ or ‘intellectual capitalism’
reflect the ever-growing role of
knowledge in the wealth creation.
The important question is how
to maintain and upgrade national
competitiveness in the face of
two conflicting developments:
one, emerging geo-economic bor-
ders and the other, increasingly
borderless knowledge economy.
In this juncture, the issue of
national competitiveness cannot
be separated from these funda-
mental realignments. The rela-
tionship between these two phe-
nomenon hides the important
clues to understand the issue of
national competitiveness. In other
words, how knowledge, global-
ization and regions are linked
and interlinked with the ques-
tion of national competitiveness
can shed new light in the old
issue of competitiveness.
Thus, it is about time to re-
think logics and regimes of geo-economics such as EC, and NAFTA
in the changed operating environment of knowledge; and see
whether these regimes are positively contributing in the long-
term national competitiveness or adversely constraining it. It is
important to know that how long politically motivated geo-eco-
nomic arrangements can contain the borderless and global nature
of knowledge backed by technological and economic forces. In
the face of increased global mobility of created intangible assets,
which are playing the central role in the money making, spatial
confining of knowledge may prove to be counter productive. In
a politically motivated bid to increase competitiveness, the propagators
of the geo-economic arrangements are ignoring the inherent
weaknesses of the respective regions which can be a major stum-
bling bloc in their quest to re-invent competitiveness.
This study proceeds in the following way. Section 1 evaluates
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the changed operating dynamics, where ‘economies of scale’ are
increasingly getting dominated by ‘ideas of scale’, national competi-
tiveness lies not on the tangible created assets but mostly on the
intangible created assets, which can be sourced around the globe.
It argues that policies designed to achieve long-term national
competitiveness must ensure the suitable environment for attract-
ing intangible created assets. Section II outlines the sources of
national competitiveness, which are deeply rooted in the clear
understanding of growing dichotomy between geo-economic re-
gimes and the borderless global knowledge economy. It argues
that traditional trade and location models, such as Heckscher-
Ohlin trade models, which were primarily designed to explain the
optimum patterns between countries, based on the distribution of
immobile factor endowments. And, similarly location theories,
which were concerned with the optimum asset-exploiting activi-
ties and explicitly acknowledged the role of transaction costs of
spatially proximate activities are no longer relevant to explain
the spatially dispersed global knowledge economy. It argues that
the collapse in the distance related transaction cost, high mobility
rate of knowledge workers within and across countries, and spread
of market economies around the world has made firms not to
concentrate their activities within a limited spatial area.
Section III argues that the most decisive input in the knowl-
edge production function is new economic knowledge. Knowl-
edge as an input in a production function is inherently different
from the more traditional inputs of labor, capital and land. As
knowledge is exogenous and embodied in a worker, it easily can
spillover. This explains the competitiveness of the small firms,
which relay on the knowledge spillovers from the universities and
other research labs. Section IV provides the main argument of this
study that “knowledge externalities” has substantially diminished
the importance of location. Knowledge clusters lack stickiness to
a location. It refutes the logic of immobility of ‘tacit knowledge’
by arguing that vastly increased mobility of knowledge workers
across nations, and continents have proved the mobility of tacit
knowledge.
Section V put analytical conclusions before empirical reality
emanating from two important geo-economic regions, EC and
NAFTA. Sectoral preferences in the capital markets as well as in
the FDI flows indicate the true extent of knowledge economy in
the regions of EC and NAFTA. Empirical facts go in favor of the
knowledge economy of NAFTA which is far more competitive than
the EC. The cause of this divergence lies in their differing level of
focus in the geo-economic regimes. Section VI suggests vital policy
implications emanating from geo-economic focus such as regional
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economic blocs to gain national competitiveness, particularly in
the era of borderless global knowledge economy.
Section VII concludes that the policies of spatial confining of
knowledge in an inward-looking fashion may very well invite the
danger of ‘knowledge eclipse” or at least locking the economies in
the inherent regional weaknesses. The comparative case surveys of
EC and NAFTA, with differing levels of focus in the spatial concen-
tration of knowledge economy, and quite different level of perfor-
mance in the field of knowledge economy confirms the basic
premises of this study that the nature and dynamics of knowledge
is global not regional or national. Thus, the logics and regimes of
regional geo-economic outfits need to have a rethinking.
Section I:
Globalization, Knowledge Economy and the Issue of National
Competitiveness
The mechanism of wealth creation has witnessed a fundamen-
tal reorganization with deep-rooted structural changes in the
world economy. It has shifted from the ‘natural assets’, through
tangible assets to intangible assets (notable land and relatively
unskilled labor), through tangible created assets (notably build-
ing, machinery and equipment, and finance), to intangible cre-
ated assets (notably knowledge and information of all kinds),
which may be embodied in human beings, in organizations, or in
physical assets (John Dunning, 2000). For example, it has been
estimated that, whereas in the 1950s, 80 percent of the value
added in US manufacturing industry represented primary or pro-
cessed foodstuff, materials, or mineral products, and 20 percent
knowledge, by 1995, these proportions had changed to 30 and 70
percent respectively (Stewart 1997). No less significant the book
value of the tangible assets of corporations is becoming a de-
creasing component of their market value. One estimate (Handy
1990) put this at between 25 and 33 percent in the mid-1980s,
while Leif Edvinson 1997) has more recently calculated that, for
most organizations, the ratio of their intellectual capital to that
of their physical and financial capital is between five-to-one to
sixteen-to one.
Between 1975 and 1995, expenditure on all kinds of research
and development in the OECD economies rose three times the rate
of output in the manufacturing industry (OECD 1997). Over the
same period, while the number of patents registered in the USA
increased from 76,800 to 113,600, i.e. by 48 percent, those in the
more knowledge intensive sectors,1  rose from 16,827 to 47,533,
i.e. by 182 per cent (US Patent and Trade Mark Office 1997). The
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proportion of the age group 15-24 engaged in higher education
increased from 35 per cent in 1980 to 56 percent in 1993 (World
Bank 1997). Finally, capital sending on information technology,
which, in 1965, was only one-third of that on production technol-
ogy, now exceeds it. In all the segments of economy, created
intangible assets are replacing natural or created tangible assets
as the main source of wealth augmentation in industrial societies.
Seeking intangible created assets, which are increasable and
mobile is very different than tangible assets. This shift requires a
fundamental rethinking of the relevance of the leading tradi-
tional paradigms. The most important is the “economies of scale”2
which was of primary importance in the firm’s strategy to aug-
ment tangible assets. It required large economic scale to operate.
But, with the advent of knowledge economy more than ‘econo-
mies of scale’, there is a need for the ‘ideas of scale’. Asian
economic crisis of 1997 proved that giant corporation such as
Korean Chaebols, which benefited from the economies of scale,
are no longer competitive. They are forced to reinvent new com-
petitiveness based on the created intangible assets.
The value of ideas is obvious in today’s knowledge-based economy
when small start-up firms with limited resources, but with the
unique knowledge or practices, fetch very high prices on the stock
market. For example, in 1998, Lucent Technologies of the USA
paid roughly US 1 billion dollars for a tiny company in Maryland
called Yurie, specializing in ATM and IP telephone technologies.
Yurie had sales of US 51 million dollars in 1997. In Sweden, a
small company named Netcom Systems with only some 1,200
employees, active in fixed telephony (starting 1991) and mobile
telephony (starting 1981) in the Nordic countries, is valued at
around 30 billion SEK. The Swedish state-owned telecom operator
Telia, active in telephone services since the late 19th century, and
with some 23,000 employees, is valued at only around twice the
value of Netcom Systems. In more and more industries we see a
‘fresh start’: they build activities for a relatively open global
market, they invest in new technologies and new people without
enormous sunk costs, they face deregulated markets, they can out
source standardize activities on a global scale by utilizing the
most efficient suppliers of services, product, design, and so forth.
1 These knowledge intensive sectors include chemicals and pharmaceuticals, machinery and electrical
equipment, computers and office equipments, industrial and scientific instruments.
2 A reduction in long-run average cost as a result of an expansion in output which leads to
increasing returns of scale. Returns to scale can be shown by their effect on long-run average
costs (LARC). They can be increasing (output growing faster then inputs), constant (inputs and
output increasing at the same rate) or decreasing (output growing at a slower rate than inputs).
The returns which are most characteristic of a particular economy will determine whether it is
growing, stagnating, or in decline.
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Established MNCs with the ‘economies of scale’ are not able to
compete with these start-ups with the ‘ideas of scale’.
In this changed dynamics, where ‘economies of scale’ are in-
creasingly getting dominated by ‘ideas of scale’, national com-
petitiveness lies not on the tangible created assets but mostly on
the intangible created assets, which can be better sourced out
beyond geo-economic limits of nation or region. The debate be-
tween ‘new economy’ and the ‘old economy’ indicates the shift-
ing pattern in the national competitiveness. Thus, the policies
designed to achieve long-term national competitiveness must ensure
the suitable environment for attracting intangible created assets.
Intangible asset-seeking FDI is the most sensitive type investment,
which is increasingly borderless in nature. Next section deals with
the growing dichotomy between geo-economic regimes and the
borderless global knowledge economy.
Section II
The Growing Dichotomy between Geo-economic Regimes and
the Borderless Global Knowledge Economy
The changed fundamentals of the national competitiveness are
deeply rooted in the clear understanding of growing dichotomy
between geo-economic regimes
and the borderless global knowl-
edge economy. Recent rise of
geo-economic regimes doesn’t
mean that new wealth-creating
activities are concentrating spa-
tially. Our understanding about
‘spatial dispersion’ of knowl-
edge economy is at best super-
ficial. Theories and models based
on the old operating dynamics
cannot explain this new di-
chotomy. Traditional trade and
location models, such as Hecks-
cher-Ohlin trade models, were
primarily designed to explain
the optimum patterns between
countries, based on the distri-
bution of immobile factor en-
dowments. Similarly location
theories, which were concerned with the optimum asset-exploit-
ing activities and explicitly acknowledged the role of transaction
costs of spatially proximate activities, are no longer relevant to
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knowledge economy. Recent rise
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explain the spatially dispersed global knowledge economy. Con-
temporary trade and location theories are more contextual than
the traditional ones but no longer useful for this new situation.
These theories are only a persuasive explanation of some kind of
cross-border division of labor- particularly of natural resource
intensive activities but they are less comfortable in explaining the
distribution of knowledge-intensive activities.
The drastic reduction in the distance related transaction cost,
high mobility rate of knowledge workers within and across coun-
tries, and spread of market economies around the world has made
firms not to concentrate their activities within a limited spatial
area. This spatial dispersion also increases as the firms shift their
strategic perspective from a stand-alone posture to one that ac-
knowledges that to compete effectively in their final product
markets they need to cooperate with other firms in the interme-
diate product market. In the last three decades or so, the created
assets, accumulated as the results of firm’s past investments, have
become increasingly knowledge-based and mobile around the
globe. They now form the basis for larger part of international
direct investment and cross-border strategic alliances. Larger part
of FDI is of intangible asset-seeking nature. The newly found
mobility has improved, in high economic regions, the terms of
trade of intangible assets at the expense of those which are
location bound. As a rising proportion of world economic output
relies on knowledge-intensive inputs and as the knowledge-inten-
sity of these inputs itself increases as a result of technological
advances, established economic regions face adjustment costs as
spatially mobile assets seek their most profitable locations else-
where.
At the same time, the mobility of knowledge-intensive assets
has potentially improved the demand for the immobile factors in
low cost regions if created assets can be attracted to the region.
Economic policy in high cost industrialized regions can be seen as
recognizing and reacting to this shift in terms of intellectual and
financial assets. The new spatial mobility of created intangible
assets comes at the same time as the break down of traditional
national competitiveness in the technologically moderate indus-
tries of developed countries, so that there will be geographic
reallocation of resources within countries as well internationally.
In other words, global knowledge economy is leading a dispersion
of knowledge-intensive production between and within coun-
tries; and convergence in cross-border economic activities. Greater
the degree of knowledge intensity of a particular activity, the
easier it is for workers to migrate across regions and countries;
and the lower the distance related cost, the easier it is for com-
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panies to spatially disperse. This
trend is creating a dichotomy
between geo-economic regimes
such as EC and NAFTA and the
emerging borderless global knowl-
edge economy. How this spatial
dispersion in economic activities
and regional integration will affect
the clustering of industry spe-
cific units has become an impor-
tant issue. What new tools and
theoretical models have been
developed to understand the fun-
damental realignment in the spatial
distribution of knowledge-based economic activities forms the
basis of next section.
Section III
The Knowledge Production Function and its Spillovers
Zvi Griliches (1979) formalized the model of production func-
tion, which is most prevalent in the literature of technological
change, sets forth that firms exist exogenously and then engage
in the pursuit of new economic knowledge as an input into the
process of generating innovative activity. The most decisive input
in the knowledge production function is new economic knowl-
edge. Knowledge as an input in a production function is inher-
ently different from the more traditional inputs of labor, capital
and land. While the economic value of the traditional inputs is
relatively certain, knowledge is intrinsically uncertain and its
potential value is asymmetric across economic agents. The most
important, although not the only source new knowledge, is con-
sidered to be research and development (R&D). Other key factors
generating new economic knowledge include a high degree of
human capital, a skilled labor force, and a high presence of
scientist and engineers.
There is considerable empirical evidence supporting the model
of the knowledge production function. This empirical link be-
tween knowledge inputs and innovative output apparently be-
comes increasingly aggregated. For example, at the unit of obser-
vation of countries; the relationship between R&D and patents is
very strong. The most innovative countries, such as U.S., Japan
and Germany, also tend to undertake high investments in R&D. By
contrast, little patent activity is associated with the developing
countries, which have very low R&D expenditures. Similarly the
The drastic reduction in thedistance related transaction
cost, high mobility rate of
knowledge workers within and
across countries, and spread of
market economies around the
world has made firms not to
concentrate their activities
within a limited spatial
area.
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links between R&D and innovative output, measured in terms of
either patents or new product innovations is also very strong
when the unit of observation is the industry. The most innovative
industries, such as computers, instruments, and pharmaceuticals
tend to be the most R&D intensive. Audertsch (1995) finds a simple
correlation coefficient of 0.74 between R&D inputs and innova-
tion output at the level of four-digit standard industrial classifi-
cation (SIC) industries. However, when the knowledge production
function is tested for the unit of observation of the firm, the link
between knowledge inputs and innovative output becomes either
tenuous and weakly positive in some studies and even non-exis-
tent or negative in others. The model of the knowledge produc-
tion function becomes particularly weak when small firms are
included in the sample. This is not surprising, since formal R&D is
concentrated among the largest corporations, but a series of stud-
ies (Acs and Audretsch 1990) has clearly documented that small
firms account for a disproportionate share of new product inno-
vations given their low R&D expenditure.
The breakdown of the knowledge production function at the
level of the firm raises the question that where do innovative
firms with little or no R&D get the knowledge inputs? The ques-
tion becomes particularly relevant for small and new firms that
undertake little R&D themselves, yet contribute considerable in-
novative activities in newly emerging industries such as biotech-
nology and computer software (Audretsch 1995). One answer that
has recently emerged in the economic literature is the third-party
firms or research institutions affiliated with the universities. Eco-
nomic knowledge may spillover from the highly specialized firm
focused only on R&D or the research laboratory of a university
(Baptista 1997). Two major channels for knowledge spillover have
been identified. Both of these spillover mechanisms revolve around
the issue of appropriability of new knowledge. Cohen and Levinthal
(1989) suggests that firms develop the capacity to adopt new
technology and ideas developed in other firms and are therefore
able to appropriate some of the returns accruing to investments
in new knowledge made externally.
Taking a different perspective, Audretsch (1995) proposes shift-
ing the unit of observation away from exogenously assumed firms
to individuals, such as scientist, engineers, or other knowledge
workers- agents with endowments of new economic knowledge.
When the focus is shifted away form the firm to individual as the
relevant unit of the observation, then the question becomes how
can economic agents with a given endowment of new knowledge
best appropriate the returns from that knowledge? It is when the
scientist and engineers can pursue the new idea within the orga-
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nizational structure of the firm developing the new knowledge
and appropriate roughly the expected value of that knowledge,
he has no reason to leave. On the other hand, if he places a
greater value on his ideas than do the decision-making bureau-
cracy of the incumbent firm, he may choose to start a new firm
to appropriate the value of his knowledge. Thus, in this spillover,
the knowledge production function is actually reversed. The knowledge
is exogenous and embodied in a worker. The firm is created
endogenously in the worker’s effort to appropriate the value of
his knowledge through innovative activity.
The reversed model of knowledge production function where
knowledge is exogenous and embodied in the individual, not the
company, makes the case for spatial dispersion. Exogenous nature
of knowledge makes it inherently different from the more tradi-
tional inputs of labor, capital and land. Economic value of knowl-
edge is intrinsically uncertain and its potential values vary across
economic agents. Also, knowledge is embodied in the individual
who’s interest in the spatial dispersion can be very different from
the decision of a firm. Thus, the national competitiveness lies in
its capacity to attract knowledge embodied in the individuals. In
other words, attracting brains becomes the new parameter in the
national competitive advantage that is more global than the
spatial confine. Next section discusses the diminishing importance
of location in the era of slippery slope of knowledge.
Section IV
The Diminishing Importance of Location: Slippery Slope of
Knowledge Economy3
Adding to the reverse model of knowledge production func-
tion, there are many other theoretical innovations to comprehend
the growing dichotomy between spatial concerns and the knowl-
edge concerns. Krugman (1991) and others have argued that knowledge
externalities are so important and forceful that there is no com-
pelling reason for geographic boundary to limit the spatial extent
of the knowledge4 . Also, the increasing mobility of firm-specific
assets and the growing complimentarity between different kinds
of technology has fostered diversity of economic activity, often
with beneficial consequences for inventory output. Castells and
Henderson (1987) argue that the logic and dynamics of territorial
development are increasingly place-less. The Economist proclaimed
3 Ann Markusen (1996) has referred it as the paradox of ‘sticky places within slippery space’.
4 The others include, Castells and Henderson (1987) argues that the logic and dynamics of
territorial development are increasingly placeless; O’ Brien (1992); talked about the end of geography;
and Ohmae (1995) declared the end of the nation state.
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‘The Death of Distance’5  by ar-
guing that geographic location
is important to the process link-
ing knowledge spillovers to in-
novative activity in a world of
e-mail, fax machines, and
cyberspace may seem surprising
and paradoxical.
In this context, a distinction
has been suggested between
knowledge and information.
Information such as price of
commodity or value of a cur-
rency can be easily codified and
has a singular meaning and in-
terpretation. By contrast, knowledge is vague, difficult to codify,
and often only serendipitously recognized. While the marginal
cost of transmitting information across geographic space has been
rendered invariant by the telecommunication revolution, the marginal
cost of transmitting knowledge, and especially tacit knowledge,
rises with distance. Von Hipple (1994) shows that high-context,
uncertain knowledge, or what he terms ‘sticky knowledge’, is best
transmitted via face-to-face interaction. Kenneth Arrow (1962)
pointed out long ago that tacit knowledge is inherently non-rival
in nature.
However, it is understood that tacit knowledge needs face-to-
face interaction but vastly increased mobility of researchers, en-
gineers and scientists can provide face-to-face meeting of minds
across continents. Universities and other research labs are no more
national. This mobility of knowledge holders refutes the claim
that even tacit knowledge can confine in the spatial area. Thus,
the original Marshallian reasons6  for clustering doesn’t hold much
relevance, however, as noted by Giersch (1996) variety of ‘soft
locational factors and access to knowledge and learning capabili-
ties still hold a chance7 . In the era of highly mobile knowledge
individuals, knowledge clusters doesn’t have long-term sustainability
5 ‘The Death of Distance’, The Economist, 30 September 1995.
6 The important Marshallian reasons for clustering are: the access to a pool of flexible skilled
labor, common support services and availability of non-tradable specialized inputs, the capturing of
information spillovers, a more competitive and/or entrepreneurial environment, and a common set
of shared values and ideologies.
7 Giersch explains that as the economic variables affecting production cost in different countries
converge, so the non-economic variables affecting transaction costs become more significant determinants
of locational competition. Such variables include the ethics of property and contracts, attitude to
technical progress, modes of corporate and individual behavior, economic and civic morality, and
cultural assets.
In this context, a distinction hasbeen suggested between
knowledge and information.
Information such as price of
commodity or value of a currency
can be easily codified and has a
singular meaning and interpreta-
tion. By contrast, knowledge is
vague, difficult to codify, and
often only serendipitously
recognized.
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as they can be easily out competed by rival clusters. For example,
software cluster in the South Indian city Banglore (recently changed
to Bengaluru) has many other clusters to rival. Thus, knowledge
clusters lack stickiness to a location. Next section provides empiri-
cal confirmation to the fact that in the slippery slop of knowl-
edge, recent rise in the geo-economic regimes may not improve
national or say regional competitiveness.
Section V
Geo-Economics vs. Knowledge Economics: NAFTA and EC in the
Comparative Perspective
The efforts to quantify linkages between geo-economic re-
gimes and the development of knowledge economy may not
deliver the intended results. However, the nature and distribution
of investment capital flows, both domestic and foreign can reveal
the concentration of investment in the specific sectors. Also,
sectoral preferences indicated by capital markets can outline the
true extent of knowledge-based economy. John Dunning (1993)
points out that literature dealing with the issue of foreign invest-
ment has identified four major strategies motivating foreign di-
rect investment (FDI): 1) market-seeking, 2) resource-seeking, 3)
efficiency-seeking, and, 4) strategic asset seeking. Among these
strategies our interest is with the strategic asset seeking FDI,
which moves to obtain access to particular knowledge assets.
The differing level of devel-
opment in the knowledge econo-
my of EC and NAFTA can be gazed
by taking note of FDI flows re-
lated to the strategic asset-seek-
ing scheme. The flow of FDI in
EC has been more towards seek-
ing the market access due to
potentially large integrated market
than to enhance strategic knowl-
edge assets in the region. The
flow of FDI in NAFTA, particu-
larly in USA suggests a strong
inclination towards acquiring stra-
tegic assets to improve firm’s com-
petitiveness. Moreover, the na-
ture of FDI has changed as well. The 1990s have seen the shift
towards mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and away from the Greenfield
investments, and account for more than 85 percent of total FDI.
Between 1991-1998, the value of cross border M&As in North
The efforts to quantify linkages between geo-economic
regimes and the development of
knowledge economy may not
deliver the intended results.
However, the nature and distri-
bution of investment capital
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can reveal the concentration of
investment in the specific
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America grew more than six-fold, from $ 85 billion dollars to $558
billion dollars. Over the 1991-1998 period, North America ac-
counted 30 per cent of global inward cross-border M&As. The tope
five countries in this regard are the United States (27%), the
United Kingdom (14%), Germany (5%), France (5%), and Canada
(4%) (OECD 2000). M&A activities show that foreign firms moved
heavily in the US to acquire intangible created assets, whereas in
the EC region the basic direction of FDI and M&As has been
limited to the market-seeking activities. Figure: 1 shows cross-
border mergers and acquisitions during the period of 1991-98.
Figure 1: Cross-border mergers and acquisitions, 1991-98
Source: Kang and Johnson (2000).
Table 1 shows that trend emerged in the 1990s continued in the
2000s, cross-border M&As in North America and European Commu-
nity witness substantial increase however EC M&As suggest geo-
economic focus with Eastward expansion of regional economic
bloc, whereas in North America M&A wave concentrated on ac-
quiring intangible assets.
Table 1: Value of Cross-border M&As in NAFTA and
European Community / (Millions of Dollars)
Regions 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
European
Community 381250 246501 159462 219397 477530 509018 847882
North America 191902 127214 130948 198899 201949 262265 448386
Source: UNCTAD, various years
Note: * first-half of 2008
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Capital markets and the venture funds have shown strong lean-
ing towards knowledge-centered stocks and Initial Public Offer-
ings (IPOs) around the world. Venture capital markets are both a
driver and an outcome of the development of knowledge-based
economies. However, venture capital tied to the innovative ideas
in the US market was substantially larger than EC. It has fuelled
the development of knowledge-based Internet and biotechnology
industries in the United States. In 1999, IT related companies
attracted more then two-third of total US venture capital funds.
US venture capital market, estimated more than $ 48 billion dollar
in 1999, up from only $18 billion dollars in 1998 is by far highest
in the OECD area. However, venture capital markets have ex-
panded rapidly in the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent in
some other European countries but seen in the comparative per-
spective US venture capital exceeds rest of the EC by a wide
margin. This strong venture capital inclination towards innova-
tive ideas comes from US willingness to attract global knowledge.
Whereas in EC, much more emphasis was given to geo-economic
dimensions then the global outlook in attracting the intangible
created assets. Figure: 2 shows much higher share of US venture
capital invested in high-technology sector than the rest of the
European countries.
Figure 2: Average share of venture capital invested in
high-technology sectors, 1995-98
Source: Science, Technology and Industry Outlook, OECD, 2000.
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The data shown about FDI, venture capital and M&A in the
regions of EC and NAFTA indicates that in all cases NAFTA’s capa-
bility to attract capital seeking intangible assets exceeds EC by a
wide margin. This gap between these crucial indicators confirms
our basic argument of this paper that region-centric EC couldn’t
match its performance with the globe-centric NAFTA. This empiri-
cal confirmation leads to a rethinking about over-emphasis in the
geo-economic regimes. Table: 2 shows the cross-border ownership
of inventions between NAFTA countries and EC countries.
Table 2: Cross Table-Border Ownership of Inventions /
Percentages
 Foreign owership of Domestic ownership of
 domestic inventions [1] foregin inventions [2]
1993-95 1993-95
Canada 23,5 16,9
Mexico 48 10,4
United Staes 5 8,8
European Union 6,5 3,5
[1] Share of patent applications to the European Patent Office owned by foreign residents in total
patents invented domestically.
[2] Share of patents applications to the European Patent Office invented abroad in total patents
owned by country residents.
Source: OECD, based on the data from the European Patent Office
Section VI
Policy Implications
Analysis in this study indicates to the vital policy lessons,
particularly in the era of inward-looking, close-ended regionalization
projects. The findings of the study suggests that ‘spatial confine-
ment’ on national/regional basis may have positive impact in
creating the ‘economies of scale’ in an industrial economy, how-
ever for a post-industrial economy where knowledge has acquired
center stage in the wealth creating mechanism, national competi-
tiveness increasingly lies in the ‘ideas of scale’.
The policies aimed at incubating ideas require free flow of
knowledge at the global scale, means fewer restrictions on the
movement of knowledge carriers such as researchers, researches
and research institutes. Therefore, policy aimed at deeper rethink-
ing regarding regional economic blocs is needed as global knowl-
edge economy knows no boundaries. Recent wave of bilateral/
multilateral FTAs may prove to be counter productive and finally
pose a threat to the global free trade regime
Relaciones Internacionales - Nº 38/2010258
In the short/ or medium-term, nations/regions may see positive
impact on their competitiveness due to increasing ‘economy of
scale’, however in the long-term with knowledge at the center
stage in wealth creation mechanism, governments can see eroded
competitiveness. Based on the findings of this study, developing
economies should make policies capable of moving them beyond
the ‘geo-economic traps’, such as regional FTAs, and initiate new
policies that can enhance globally-open knowledge economy re-
gime based on free flow of information/ideas/ and knowledge.
Boosting national competitiveness in the era of borderless global
knowledge economy is fundamentally different than during the
industrial era where ‘economies of scale’ mattered the most.
Therefore, innovative policies promoting production, transfer and
management of knowledge are required.
Section VII
Conclusion
This study confirms that the differing levels of competitiveness
in the knowledge economies of EC and NAFTA are linked with the
growing dichotomy between geo-economic regimes and borderless
global knowledge economy. The comparative case surveys of EC
and NAFTA indicate that geo-economics may bring the ‘economies
of scale’ but in the era of intellectual capitalism ‘ideas of scale’
defines the basic parameters of national and regional competi-
tiveness. Geography-bound ap-
proach can lock nations and firms
alike in the inherent regional
weaknesses. It distorts incentives
for the firms and individuals to
take opportunity globally.
Given the exogenous nature
of knowledge, it may be counter
productive to pursue policies of
‘spatial confinement’. The poli-
tics of spatial confining of knowl-
edge goes against the very na-
ture of knowledge creation and
invites the possibility of danger-
ous ‘knowledge eclipse’. The recent European Commission report
on the competitiveness remarks that EC has lost substantially to
the US in the post war period, and its living standard is way
behind US. This acknowledgment is in line with the hypothesis of
this paper, which argues a rethinking of over-stressed ‘region-
centric’ approach taken by EC. Ignoring globe in favor of nation
This study confirms that thediffering levels of competi-
tiveness in the knowledge
economies of EC and NAFTA
are linked with the growing
dichotomy between geo-eco-
nomic regimes and
borderless global knowl-
edge economy.
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or region can have substantial economic costs. ‘Globe-centric’
approach, taken by USA and NAFTA, offers the empirical
validation to the argument that knowledge economy by
nature requires no boundaries, either of nation or region.
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